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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the wide agreement that females are more risk averse than males.
We survey the existing experimental literature, finding that significance and magnitude of
gender differences are task-specific. We gather data from 54 Holt and Laury (2002) repli-
cations, involving more than 7000 subjects. Gender differences appear in less than 10% of
the studies, and are significant but negligible in magnitude once all the data are pooled. We
exclude that this result is driven by noisier HL data. Gender differences appear to correlate
with the presence of a safe option and fixed probabilities in the elicitation method.
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1. Introduction
Gender differences in risk preferences are often regarded as a stylised fact in the eco-
nomics and psychology literature. Many studies as well as the available meta-analyses find
that women display a more risk averse behaviour than men when confronted with decisions
under risk. In economics, for instance, surveys made by Eckel and Grossman (2008c) and
Croson and Gneezy (2009) find mostly supporting evidence and investigate the robustness
of this result along several dimensions, such as the characteristics of the subject pool, the
strength of incentives, the gain vs. loss domain, the abstract vs. contextual framework. These
surveys, though, are based on a relatively small sample of studies (16 and 10, respectively,
3 of which in common) given the variety of designs covered. As noted by Charness and
Gneezy (2012) and Holt and Laury (2014), the differences in the methods used to measure
the preferences can act as an additional source of heterogeneity. Consequently, Charness and
Gneezy (2012) focus on a single elicitation method, the Investment Game, and find strong
evidence that females are less willing to take risk. In psychology, Byrnes et al. (1999) pro-
vide a meta-analysis including 150 studies, using a broad definition of risk, from smoking to
driving to gambling, and analyzing self- reported, incentivised, as well as observed choices.
The study finds that males take more risks than females in most of the risk categories, even
though the magnitude of the effect is usually small, seldom significant, and some studies
find contrary evidence.
Despite the apparently wide agreement that females are more risk averse than males,
we believe that the evidence supporting this view cannot be considered conclusive for two
reasons. First, there are important branches of the literature still largely unexplored. For
instance, the Holt and Laury (2002) (henceforth, HL) task has never been the subject of a
comprehensive analysis by gender, despite being by far the most popular elicitation method
in economics according to the number of citations. Moreover, in the Bomb Risk Elicitation
Task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013a) no gender difference was found. Second, no attempt
has been made yet to investigate whether and how the elicitation methods play a role in
shaping the observed results by gender. Risk attitudes are a latent construct that can only be
indirectly and imperfectly measured: their measurement is by construction a combination
of the latent preferences and the measurement error induced by the tool used to elicit them.
Crosetto and Filippin (2013b) analyse to what extent, and in which direction the measured
risk preferences are shaped by the characteristics of the elicitation task adopted. In this
paper we aim to extend this exercise along a gender dimension.
We first provide a thorough survey of the literature, finding mixed results. We then focus
on the unexplored HL task. Unfortunately, only a small fraction of contributions explicitly
report about gender differences, because HL is usually a companion task in unrelated ex-
perimental studies. Only twenty papers, out of the more than five hundred citing Holt and
Laury (2002), provide data on the gender breakdown of risk preferences. Contrary to the
widespread consensus, out of these twenty papers, only three report significant gender dif-
ferences in risk preferences.
This striking result, combined with the presence of large amounts of uncharted HL gen-
der data, spurred us to directly contact the authors of the 94 published HL replications. We
collected the data of 54 published studies, corresponding to almost eight thousand subjects,
and reduced them to a common comparable format.
The resulting dataset increases dramatically the information as compared to that avail-
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able in published results and allows us to provide conclusive evidence about gender differ-
ences in HL. The results consistently show that gender differences are the exception rather
than the rule in HL replications. Men and women display a similar behaviour, and when a
difference can be detected it is usually small.
The large amount of comparable data also allows us to greatly increase the statistical
power of the analysis. Moreover, access to all microdata allows us to exploit the data of sub-
jects making inconsistent choices using a structural model estimated with maximum likeli-
hood. The results on the pooled data show a comeback of significant gender differences, but
the magnitude of the effect turns out to be economically unimportant. Differences amount
to one sixth of a standard deviation, less than a third of the effect found by other elicitation
methods analysed in this paper (e.g., by Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Eckel and Grossman,
2008b).
Our results indicate that the frequency and the importance of gender differences reflect
specific characteristics of the elicitation methods over and above true differences in the un-
derlying (and latent) risk attitudes. Importantly, such a heterogeneity of the gender pattern
is not due to the fact that HL induces more noise than other tasks, something that, if true,
would make it more difficult to detect the same differences in the underlying preferences.
Observing a gender gap not only depends on the task being contextual or not (Eckel and
Grossman, 2008a), on it having to do with risk or with uncertainty (Wieland and Sarin, 2012),
or on the choices being incentivised, self-reported or observed (Byrnes et al., 1999). Even re-
stricting the analysis to the narrow domain of incentivised lottery choice tasks currently
used in experimental economics, gender differences depend on the details of the task. We
single out two characteristics that jointly correlate with the likelihood of observing gender
differences: a) the presence of a safe option within the choice set, and b) the use of lotteries
with 50%− 50% fixed probabilities in tasks that generate the menu of lotteries changing the
amounts at stake.
Published results as well as our dataset do not allow us to further investigate and to
disentangle the effect of each of these two characteristics. Nevertheless, we believe that this
paper provides a leap forward in the understanding of gender differences in risk preferences
from two points of view. First, it makes clear that, instead of being treated as a fact, gen-
der differences should be analysed jointly with the characteristics of the task used to elicit
risk preferences. Second, it greatly restricts the set of possible determinants. In a compan-
ion paper we analyse this issue by means of controlled experiments, but without finding
conclusive evidence (Crosetto and Filippin, 2014). The availability of a riskless alternative
allows to rationalise gender differences in some but not in all the cases, while the 50%− 50%
fixed probabilities do not play a significant role.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarises the state of the art in the
literature about gender differences in risk preferences and presents the survey of the few
HL published results by gender. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the dataset of
HL replications we built and use. Section 4 analyses our dataset, first paper by paper and
then pooling the data, using both descriptive statistics and structural modeling allowing
for errors in the choices. Section 5 discusses which characteristics of the task could trig-
ger the stark difference in behaviour observed, identifying some candidates, and Section 6
concludes.
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2. Literature Review
There are more risk elicitation methods than can be mentioned here. Our ambition is
not that of providing an exhaustive survey of the results by gender across the different tasks
used to measure risk preferences. In contrast, the goal of this section is to summarise the
state of the art in the risk and gender literature. Consequently, we limit our analysis to three
representative and widely used methods: the Investment Game, introduced by Gneezy and
Potters (1997), an Ordered Lottery Selection task proposed by Eckel and Grossman (2002,
2008b), and the Holt and Laury (2002) task, the most cited and replicated risk elicitation
method.
In the Investment Game (henceforth IG) subjects decide how to allocate a given endow-
ment E between a safe account and a risky lottery that yields with 50% probability 2.5 times
the amount invested, zero otherwise. The task is framed as an investment decision, and
a risk neutral subject should invest all of her endowment, since the marginal return of the
risky option is greater than one.
In the Eckel and Grossman task (henceforth EG) subjects make a single choice, picking
one out of an ordered set of lotteries. This method has been first introduced in the literature
to specifically measure risk preferences by Binswanger (1981). In the EG implementation
subjects are faced with 5 lotteries characterised by a linearly increasing expected value as
well as greater standard deviation (see Table 1). The task is not framed, and a risk neutral
subject should choose lottery 5, since it has the highest expected value.
Choice Probability Outcome
1 A 50% 16 $B 50% 16 $
2 A 50% 24 $B 50% 12 $
3 A 50% 32 $B 50% 8 $
4 A 50% 40 $B 50% 4 $
5 A 50% 48 $B 50% 0 $
Table 1: The 5 lotteries of the orginal Eckel and Grossman (2002) paper
The Holt and Laury (2002) (henceforth HL) risk elicitation method constitutes the most
widely known implementation of a multiple price list format applied to risk. The subjects
face a series of choices between pairs of lotteries, with one lottery safer (i.e., with lower vari-
ance) than the other. At the end of the experiment, one row is randomly chosen for payment,
and the chosen lottery is played to determine the payoff. The lottery pairs are ordered by
increasing expected value. The set of possible outcomes is common to every choice, and the
increase in expected value across rows is obtained by increasing the probability of the ’good’
event (see Table 2).
The subjects make a choice for each pair of lotteries, switching at some point from the
safe to the risky option as the probability of the good outcome increases. The switching
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Option A Option B
1 1/10 2 $ 9/10 1.6 $ sa 1/10 3.85 $ 9/10 0.1 $
2 2/10 2 $ 8/10 1.6 $ 2/10 3.85 $ 8/10 0.1 $
3 3/10 2 $ 7/10 1.6 $ 3/10 3.85 $ 7/10 0.1 $
4 4/10 2 $ 6/10 1.6 $ 4/10 3.85 $ 6/10 0.1 $
5 5/10 2 $ 5/10 1.6 $ 5/10 3.85 $ 5/10 0.1 $
6 6/10 2 $ 4/10 1.6 $ 6/10 3.85 $ 4/10 0.1 $
7 7/10 2 $ 3/10 1.6 $ 7/10 3.85 $ 3/10 0.1 $
8 8/10 2 $ 2/10 1.6 $ 8/10 3.85 $ 2/10 0.1 $
9 9/10 2 $ 1/10 1.6 $ 9/10 3.85 $ 1/10 0.1 $
10 10/10 2 $ 0/10 1.6 $ 10/10 3.85 $ 0/10 0.1 $
Table 2: The 10 lotteries of the original Holt and Laury (2002) paper
point captures their degree of risk aversion. A risk-neutral subject should start with Option
A, and switch to B from the fifth choice on. The higher the number of safe choices, the
stronger the degree of risk aversion. Never choosing the risky option or switching from B
to A are not infrequent and are regarded as inconsistent choices when modeling the choices
without including a stochastic component.
That women are more risk averse than men is often considered a stylised fact in the
economic literature. This finding is confirmed by some surveys (Croson and Gneezy, 2009;
Eckel and Grossman, 2008a).1 Among the risk elicitation tasks analysed in this paper, this
state of the art is well captured by both the IG and EG tasks. Both tasks have already been
object of a survey from a gender perspective, and females have been shown to consistently
display a significantly more risk averse average behaviour.
Charness and Gneezy (2012) report that in the IG the gender gap is rather systematic
and quite sizable. Males invest more than females in most of the experiments analysed,
and such a difference is usually about 10 − 15% of the initial endowment (Charness and
Genicot, 2009; Charness and Gneezy, 2004, 2010; Dreber and Hoffman, 2007; Dreber et al.,
2010; Ertac and Gurdal, 2012; Fellner and Sutter, 2009; Gong and Yang, 2012; Langer and
Weber, 2004). Significant differences, but lower than 10% in size, appear in Haigh and List
(2005), Bellemare et al. (2005), and Crosetto and Filippin (2013b), while Gneezy et al. (2009)
is the only contribution in which a gender gap does not appear. Such a result is robust to the
context (lab vs. field) in which data have been gathered as well as to other features (amounts
at stake, geographical location, type of subjects).
Similar findings emerge in the EG task, with sizable gender differences appearing both in
the original experiment and in later replications (Arya et al., 2012; Ball et al., 2010; Crosetto
and Filippin, 2013b; Dave et al., 2010; Eckel et al., 2009, 2011; Grossman and Eckel, 2009; Wik
et al., 2004). Cleave et al. (2010) find a gender gap in a wide sample but not in a subsam-
ple that participated to later experiments, but it is, to the best of our knowledge, the only
1Surveys also stress how some characteristics of the experiments make gender differences more likely to
appear. For instance, they are usually less likely to be found in contextual experiments (Eckel and Grossman,
2008a; Schubert et al., 1999).
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exception.
The results obtained using these two elicitation methods are clear-cut: women display,
on average, a significantly more risk averse behaviour. The question is, however, whether
these two tasks simply capture a regularity that holds in general, or whether instead the
observed results are a function of some characteristics of these two elicitation methods. If
this is the case, results should not be replicated at all or would be replicated to a clearly
different extent using a sufficiently different elicitation method.
The perfect example is provided by HL, which is the most popular risk elicitation method
in the literature, but whose replications have never been systematically analysed along a
gender dimension.
A survey of the literature reveals that gender differences are only rarely found in this
case. Despite the fact that more than five hundred published papers cite Holt and Laury
(2002),2 only 20 of them report the breakdown of results by gender. Out of these 20, only 3
report significant gender differences, 2 provide mixed evidence as in the original contribu-
tion, while 15 find no significant difference.
The three papers reporting a significant gender difference are Agnew et al. (2008) using
an unmodified low stake HL task, Dave et al. (2010), using the 20X high stake HL treatment,
and Brañas-Garza and Rustichini (2011), implementing a non-incentivised version with 9
choices.
The contributions reporting mixed results find a significant effect only for a subsample,
or only through one and not all statistical methods. Already in the original HL article a
gender gap appears only in the low but not in the high stake treatment. In Chen et al. (2013)
significant gender differences do not emerge in the unconditional distribution of choices,
but choices become significantly different (at 10%) when controlling for other observable
characteristics (age, race, academic major and number of siblings). Menon and Perali (2009)
on the other hand find, within one study, females to be significantly more risk averse in one
sample and significantly less in another.
The list of the 15 studies in which the behaviour of males and females does not differ
includes the first replication of the original task, (Harrison et al., 2005), Anderson and Free-
born (2010); Carlsson et al. (2012) in the field and Andersen et al. (2006); Baker et al. (2008);
Chakravarty et al. (2011); Drichoutis and Koundouri (2012); Eckel and Wilson (2004); Ehmke
et al. (2010); Harrison et al. (2013); Houser et al. (2010); Mueller and Schwieren (2012); Ponti
and Carbone (2009); Viscusi et al. (2011) and Masclet et al. (2009) in the lab.
Summarizing, the frequency of significant gender differences sharply changes according
to the elicitation method used. Significant gender differences appear using the EG and IG
tasks, while they do not using HL.
This instability of results supports the view that a latent construct like risk attitudes can
only be indirectly measured and what is observed heavily depends on the characteristics
of the risk elicitation procedure used. Applied to differences of risk preferences along a
gender perspective, this argument implies that the stylised fact describing females as more
2According to the database Scopus, queried on January 2013, 528 articles cited Holt and Laury (2002). See
below section 3 for details about these papers.
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risk averse than males could be less solid than what it appears at first glance and definitely
requires further investigation.
The evidence in this section is based on the twenty studies that provide in their pub-
lished version information about gender differences. Such evidence cannot be regarded as
conclusive, however, due to both the small size of the available sample, as compared to the
overall number of published HL replications, and to problems of data comparability across
papers. This spurred us to collect the original data of the HL replications, with the aim of
covering the largest possible number of studies. The details and results of this exercise are
described in the next section.
3. The Dataset
In this section we describe and analyse our dataset, composed of a large sample of HL
replications. The direct collection of the original data proved necessary for several reasons.
First, few studies replicating HL report gender results. Collecting the original data al-
lows us to increase the size and representativeness of the sample analysed. The final dataset
includes data from 36 articles that did not report gender results.3
Second, papers are heterogeneous in the way they report their results. Comments about
gender differences are not always accompanied by quantitative results. When results are
published, they take different and not comparable forms, such as parametric or non-parametric
tests of equality in mean or median, or coefficients in multivariate regressions. Moreover,
inconsistent choices are treated in different ways and constitute an additional source of het-
erogeneity. Collecting the data we can reduce to a common metric a large body of potentially
heterogeneous literature.
The final dataset covers 54 published and 9 unpublished papers, twice as many as all the
previous survey papers in the experimental economics literature combined.
3.1. Getting the data
For published papers we queried the Scopus bibliographic database, tracking all papers
that cited Holt and Laury (2002). We ran our query on January 31st, 2013, finding 528 citing
papers. We included some unpublished studies, either issue of a request on the Economics
Science Association discussion group or papers we came across at conferences. This resulted
in the identification of 26 additional contributions, that we treat separately.
We examined closely all the 555 papers in the resulting pool to check whether the authors
had replicated the HL experiment, in its original version or with some small variations of the
design. Among the experimental replications, we restricted the range of possible departures
from the original HL to be included in the dataset. We regard as comparable the multiple
choice lists in which the amount at stake is held constant while the increase in the expected
value of the lotteries is obtained through a higher probability of the good outcome.4 Within
3In principle, published results by gender could be the output of a process of selective reporting. In contrast,
no evidence of outcome reporting bias is found in the HL replications (for details see Crosetto et al., 2014). The
explanation for the low reporting rate seems to be the fact that the task is performed as a control, and therefore
gender differences in risk preferences are of little interest to the authors.
4In order to keep our search within tractable limits we do not include the so-called Outcome Scale version of a
multiple price lists in which an increasing safe amount is compared with a fixed 50/50 lottery, or, in general, any
7
these boundaries a multiple price list can take many different forms. For instance, we in-
clude tasks in which the number of choices is different than 10, or in which the amounts at
stake differ as compared to the original HL.
The results of this exercise are detailed in Table 3. We could not access, either in electronic
or in paper form, 48 studies. Out of the remaining contributions, we found 118 published
and 17 unpublished studies replicating the HL mechanism as described above, while 21
further papers, 16 published and 5 unpublished, used a modified version of HL, involving
a safe amount instead of the safe lottery. These papers are analysed separately in Section 5.
Articles citing Holt and Laury (2002) as of Jan 31st, 2013 Published Not published529 26
Not accessible 48 -
Not replicating Holt and Laury (2002) 347 4
Using an HL version with a safe option 16 5
Replicating Holt and Laury (2002) 118 17
of which:
Duplicate dataset 8 0
Not keeping track of gender or single gender 16 0
Universe of reference 94 17
of which:
No response or data not shared 40 8
Final dataset 54 9
of which:
Microdata (shared or available online) 48 6
Summary statistics (shared or published) 6 3
Table 3: Building the dataset of HL replications
We directly contacted the authors of all the replications, asking them for a set of summary
statistics and significance tests, or, if possible, for the original data. We sent a first email (in
two batches, on March 15th and March 28th, 2013) to the corresponding authors, and two
reminders (on July 7th and on September 17th, 2013, the latter to all authors of the papers)
to those not having answered previous messages.
Whenever the same dataset was used in two or more studies we counted it only once,
including the other references in the ’Duplicate dataset’ category. 16 studies could not be
used, either because they involved a single-gender sample, or because the gender of the
subjects was not recorded. Subtracting these particular cases leads to a universe of 111 HL
replications, 94 published and 17 unpublished, suitable for gender analysis.
task in which outcomes change and probability are fixed (see, among others, Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Andersson
et al., 2013; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Dohmen et al., 2010, 2011; Eriksen et al., 2011; Falk et al., 2006; Masatlioglu
et al., 2012; Sapienza et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2013).
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Altogether, for more than half of the relevant papers we could get either the microdata
or exhaustive summary statistics. Our final dataset includes data from 54 published and 9
unpublished papers, for a total of 8713 subjects.5
3.2. Building a homogeneous dataset
The datasets of the replications differ along several dimensions, from the purpose and
the design of the experiment to the exact format of the multiple price list. Moreover, datasets
differ in terms of which control variables are recorded, and in the way in which ’inconsistent’
choices (multiple switchers, dominated choices) are treated.
Although we try to follow the common sense rule of keeping all the information avail-
able, making datasets comparable requires to take decisions that inherently encompass a
degree of arbitrariness. The decisions and assumptions we made in building the dataset are
detailed here.
3.2.1. Design of the replications
In case of a within-subject design in which the subjects completed more than one HL
price list under different conditions (e.g. alone vs. in groups, with different frames, with
different amounts at stake) we just kept the data from the first HL table the subjects were
exposed to, provided that the task was performed by the subject alone. This reduced the
number of observations but also the problems induced by other possible confounds such as
order effects or serial correlation.
For studies employing a between-subject design, we used all observations. When the
study included different experimental conditions accompanied by the HL task – usually
used as a control for risk attitudes – we used all data as well. Changes in the HL task admin-
istered in the different treatments are infrequent and of marginal importance; nonetheless,
we take them into account through the variable treatment.
In general the rules described above allowed us to easily process the replications and
include them in the dataset. In some cases, though, the inclusion proved harder and ad-hoc
rules necessary.6
3.2.2. Level of detail of the data
Datasets come in four formats. We deal with this heterogeneity including the variable
detail.
5The number of contributions replicating HL among those currently classified as ’no response’ is likely to
be lower than the 48 (40 published and 8 not published) reported in Table 3. In fact in about the 30% of the
cases we had to exclude the paper from the sample because of a sufficiently different design or missing gender
information. Assuming a similar distribution in the residual category, we can reasonably expect the real number
of missing dataset to be in the order of thirty. This would also imply that the current coverage rate is downward
biased, and that it is likely to be already in the order of two thirds.
6In the case of Andersen et al. (2010), we faced a dataset with three different price lists, between subjects. One
of the lists was a standard ’symmetric’ one, while the other two where asymmetric (’SkewLow’ and ’SkewHigh’).
The asymmetric price lists featured 6 choices each, and the choices did not cover the whole probability range.
They instead, in the case of ’SkewLow’, covered probabilities 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 1. In order to include this
paper, we rescaled the choices to 10, assuming continuity of preferences – i.e., a subject in the missing choice 0.6
has been assumed to make the same choice, safe or risky, made in choice 0.5. In case of a gap of two choices and
of a different choice in the two observed extremes, we assigned one choice as safe, and one as risky.
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The most complete datasets provide us with data for each and every binary choice the
subjects made (detail = ’full’). Other datasets record the number of safe choices of every
subject and a dummy variable indicating whether they switched only one or multiple times
– this behaviour is usually labeled as ’inconsistent’ (detail = ’partial’). For these datasets
we can reconstruct the binary choices of the consistent (single-switchers) only, while for
multiple-switchers we cannot tell which choices were made in which lotteries, and we have
to treat their binary choices as missing. Third, five datasets report only the number of in-
dividual safe choices, but no information about inconsistent behaviour. In order not to lose
these observations, by default we assume that the authors sent us data for single-switchers
only.7 Finally, in some cases we only obtained summary statistics of the results, including
the average number of safe choices by gender, and the results of statistical tests (detail=
’summary’). In this case we cannot retrieve any information about inconsistent behaviour,
nor reconstruct the subjects’ binary choices.
Detail Consistent subjects Inconsistent subjectsMales Females Total Males Females Total
Microdata full 2119 2205 4324 411 502 913
# of safe choices + consistency partial 504 408 912 64 98 162# of safe choices only 375 324 699 3 1 4
Summary statistics (shared/published) summary 413 359 772 - -
Total 3411 3296 6707 478 601 1079
Table 4: Subjects in the sample by consistency and type of data. Published papers only. The four subjects that are
classified as inconsistent when only the number of safe choices is known are those who choose the safe lottery
when the good outcome is certain.
The breakdown of the number of consistent and inconsistent subjects in our dataset by
gender and by detail of the data is provided in Table 4. This Table is the key to identifying
the different samples used in different parts of the paper. For instance, while the description
of results by paper (Section 4.1) relies upon all the information available, the analysis of
microdata (Section 4.2) cannot include ’summary’ data, and the structural model estimation
allowing for error (Section 4.3) can instead rely upon the ’full’ datasets only.
3.2.3. Variables included in the analysis
We shrank the number of variables of interest to get a minimum common ground for
all papers and avoid having dozens of paper-specific demographics or controls. This meant
including in the final dataset only the information concerning:
• The subjects. The dataset includes a unique identification number for every participant
(subject), his choice in every binary lottery (safechoice) conditional on the complete-
ness of the data received as explained above. This is the information we exploit to
build the dependent variable used to proxy the risk attitude of the agents, i.e., the total
number of safe choices.8 Data also contain a variable summarizing whether the partic-
7We know from correspondence with the authors that for two of these papers (Rosaz, 2012; Rosaz and Ville-
val, 2012) the data cover single-switchers only. In the other cases we cannot tell, but results do not change if we
exclude these three datasets from the analysis.
8Several features of the multiple price list need to be taken into account in order to obtain a comparable
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ipant made inconsistent choices, and some individual controls such as female and
age, though the latter is not always available.
• The format of the multiple price list. The papers included in our analysis greatly differ
in the specific features of the multiple price list adopted. Examples of such differences
are: a) the number of binary choices (numchoices)and consequently the change in
the probability of the good outcome from one row to the next, b) the support of the
probability spanned ([0.1 : 1] is the most common version, but [0 : 0.7] is also rather
frequent, and we include other domains as well) and c) the variance of the outcomes.
All these features are summarised by the variables Av1 Av2 Bv1 Bv2 , storing the values
of lotteries A (safe) and B (risky), expressed in experimental units, and Ap1 Ap2 Bp1
Bp2, storing the probabilities of the four outcomes, for every decision.
• The procedure of the task. There are two variables keeping track of whether the sub-
jects’ consistency was forced or subjects were instead free to switch more than once
from option A to option B, and whether the decisions were proposed following the
increasing likelihood of the good outcome or instead in a randomorder. Regarding
the structure of the incentives, we keep track of whether choices were incentivised
or hypothetical and of the exchange rate from experimental currency to dollars. By
multiplying the amounts seen at screen by the exchange rate we can also compute the
realmoney at stake in the experiment as the expected value of the 50/50 lottery A.
• The characteristics of the experiment. Some studies focus explicitly on measuring risk
preferences directly for different subpopulations and in different contexts, or study
the task itself or different versions of it, or else contribute mainly from a theoretical
point of view to the understanding of decisions under risk. Other studies focus on
other topics, like auctions, strategic games, tournaments, and use the HL task just as a
control for risk preferences. We built the variable control to take this difference into
account. Moreover, especially for the papers in which HL was used as a control, we
record in the variable treatment the fact that the HL data might have been associated
to different treatments in the core part of the experiment.
The summary statistics of the variables included in the dataset, for the cases in which
they are informative, are detailed in Table 5.
4. Results
In this section we analyse our dataset of HL replications from a gender perspective. We
first analyse each paper separately, finding that an overwhelming majority of papers do not
measure of risk aversion across studies. For instance, making 6 safe choices in a classic HL task as that described
in Table 2 implies that the subject switches to the risky option when the probability of the good outcome is 0.7.
In contrast, making 6 safe choices in the version of the task like that implemented by Harrison et al. (2007)
corresponds to switching when the probability of the good outcome is equal to 0.35, due to the fact that in this
case there are 20 choices and the change in probability between each row is 5% instead of 10%. Therefore, we
parametrise the number of safe choices to the probability of switching in order to impose a common metric.
In the example above in Harrison et al. (2007) we assign a number of safe choices equal to 3 to a subject who
switches when the probability of the good outcome is equal to 0.35.
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Variable Type Description
Source of data
ID integer Unique ID for the paper
detail categorical See section 3.2.2
Subjects characteristics and choices
Min Mean Max
subject integer Unique ID for each subject in the dataset
safechoice dummy 1 if safe lottery A chosen, 0 if risky lottery B 0 0.573 1
inconsistent dummy 1 if multiple switches or dominated choices 0 0.149 1
female dummy 1 if female, 0 if male 0 0.499 1
age integer Age in years 0 26.12 84
Format of the multiple price list
Min Mode Max
decision integer Decision row number
numchoices integer Number of rows in the HL table 7 10 20
Av1 float High outcome of (safer) lottery A 1 2 125000
Av2 float Low outcome of (safer) lottery A 0.8 1.6 100000
Bv1 float High outcome of (riskier) lottery B 1.90 3.85 240625
Bv2 float Low outcome of (riskier) lottery B 0.05 0.1 6250
Ap1 float Probability of high outcome of lottery A
Ap2 float Probability of low outcome of lottery A
Bp1 float Probability of high outcome of lottery B
Bp2 float Probability of low outcome of lottery B
Procedure of the task
Min Mean Max
forced dummy 1 if consistency was forced, 0 otherwise 0 0.007 1
random dummy 1 if decisions in random order, 0 otherwise 0 0.063 1
incentivised dummy 1 if task paid with money, 0 otherwise 0 0.905 1
exchange float Exchange rate ECU/$ 1 37.69 2500
realmoney float Expected value ($) of Option A (50%− 50%) 0 25.5 274.8
Characteristics of the experiment
Min Mean Max
control dummy 1 if task used as control, 0 otherwise 0 0.547 1
treatment integer Treatment in the original paper (not in the HL) 1 1.566 13
Table 5: Description of the dataset, published and unpublished papers
find significant gender differences. We then pool the data to increase the statistical power
and to explore how the characteristics of the task and of the subjects affect the measured risk
preferences.
4.1. Paper by paper
The first step of the analysis is to consider each paper separately, as done in meta-
analyses. In this section we focus our attention to consistent choices (i.e., to subjects switch-
ing once and not choosing dominated options), including both published and unpublished
papers to give the vastest possible overview of the literature. For each paper we compute the
average number of safe choices by gender, the p-value of a non-parametric Mann-Whitney
test, and the Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988) as a measure of the magnitude of the effect. Cohen’s d
is a measure of the size of an effect that is independent of the sample size. It is computed as
d =
X¯ f − X¯m
s
,
where Xm and X f are the average male and female number of safe choices and s is the pooled
standard deviation. The d is positive if females are more risk averse than males and negative
if the opposite is true. Cohen (1988) indicated thresholds for interpreting his d: as long as
the discussion is related to aggregate differences, 0.2 is a small effect, 0.5 is a medium effect,
and from 0.8 on there can be said to be a large effect.9
Results are detailed in Table 6, and graphically displayed in Figure 1, which includes
only the papers for which we have full detail. Figure 1 shows the mean choice by gender
and its confidence intervals, as well as the p-value of the Mann-Whitney test. In both the
Table and the Figure, unpublished results are reported separately. In Table 6 papers are
listed alphabetically, and significant results are highlighted. In Figure 1 papers are sorted
according to the strength of their results supporting the stylised fact that women are more
risk averse. The upper part of each panel contains the papers in which females are more
risk averse than males, sorted by decreasing significance. In the lower part of the figure are
instead listed the papers (12 published, 2 unpublished) in which the average female is less
risk averse than the average male, sorted by increasing significance.
In 40 published and 6 unpublished papers females show a more risk averse average
behaviour than males, as far as point estimates are concerned. However the difference is in
the majority of cases not significant. Males are more risk averse than females in 13 published
and 3 unpublished papers, and this difference is never significant. When looking together at
the whole dataset of published and working papers, only around 12.6% (8 out of 63) of the
HL replications display significant gender differences, a result that is even weaker than the
already weak evidence of a gender difference that emerged in the survey made in Section 2.
This fraction decreases to about 9.25% (5 out of 54) restricting the analysis to the published
studies only.
While test statistics tell us if an effect can be said to apply out of sample and to the whole
population, effect size statistics tell us how substantial this effect is, irrespective of sample
9To be able to interpret the effect at the individual level – i.e., predicting with high accuracy a subject’s gender
observing his or her risk aversion only – a Cohen’s d of 2 or more is needed, with a value of 4 meaning almost
absolute discriminability (Nelson, 2014).
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size. Applying the aforementioned thresholds to our data, including both published and
unpublished papers, we find that 23 papers find a small effect, and 3 a medium effect. At
the same time 5 papers find a small and 1 a medium effect in the opposite direction (i.e.,
males more risk averse than females). 22 papers find a null effect (Cohen’s d < 0.2) in either
direction.
These descriptive statistics immediately show that gender differences in risk attitudes
are not an ubiquitous phenomenon. In contrast, using the HL task they appear as the ex-
ception rather than the rule. This finding is clearly at odds with the common wisdom in
the literature that females are more risk averse than males. However, before drawing any
conclusion we have to make sure that we are not observing a false negative: failing to detect
an effect cannot be directly interpreted as the proof of its absence. In what follows we will
come back to this point, starting from the next section in which we merge the microdata.
4.2. Merging the datasets
The goal of this section is to derive additional insights by merging all the available mi-
crodata rather than analyzing them separately. This approach has many advantages. First, it
allows us to boost the statistical power of our test, thereby almost eliminating the likelihood
of observing a false negative. Second, it makes possible to provide a precise quantitative
estimate of the magnitude of gender differences using the HL task. Third, it gives the op-
portunity to identify the determinants of the number of safe choices over and above the
role played by gender. Fourth, the panel structure of the dataset grants the opportunity
of controlling for any paper-specific characteristic, both observable and unobservable. A
byproduct of this exercise is also to deliver a precise quantitative estimate of the main find-
ings in the HL in general. However, before pursuing these goals we deal with an important
feature of the HL task, i.e. that of generating inconsistent choices.
4.2.1. Inconsistent observations
One of the features of the HL task is that it generates a significant fraction of choices that
cannot easily be interpreted. In particular, an expected utility maximiser should switch once
(and only once) from Option A to Option B. It is commonly found instead that a fraction of
subjects do not conform to this behaviour, switching from Option B to Option A. This can
be the consequence of going back and forth from Option A to B, or starting from B and then
moving to A. In both cases, such a pattern is not consistent with the behaviour of an expected
utility maximiser and for this reason such choices are usually defined as inconsistent. This
is not the only way in which the behaviour seems to contradict the predictions implied by
the axioms of Expected Utility Theory. For instance, choosing Option A when the good
outcome is sure violates monotonicity, and the same happens when choosing Option B in
the versions of HL containing a row in which the bad outcome is certain.
However, observing similar patterns does not necessarily imply a violation of the axioms
underlying expected utility, as the subjects could simply be consistent with this model but
at the same times making mistakes. We test what happens when accepting this view by
estimating a structural model with a stochastic component in Section 4.3 below. The goal
of this section is instead to describe the pattern of inconsistent choices, trying also to shed
some light on their determinants and consequences. We do so exploiting all the information
we have concerning inconsistent choices, including also the ’partial’ datasets. In contrast,
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Article Nm N f safem safe f Mann-Whitney Cohen’s d detail
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) 21 15 4.90 5.20 0.66 0.15 full
Andersen et al. (2008) 117 122 5.89 5.83 0.62 -0.03 full
Andersen et al. (2010) 65 24 6.25 6.71 0.55 0.26 partial
Baker et al. (2008) 25 11 5.28 5.63 0.56 - summary
Barrera and Simpson (2012) 32 66 5.31 5.44 0.80 0.08 full
Bauernschuster et al. (2010) 67 107 6.18 6.55 0.22 0.25 full
Bellemare and Shearer (2010) 60 24 4.18 4.92 0.06 0.34 full
Brañas-Garza and Rustichini (2011) 53 92 4.49 4.67 0.65 0.07 full
Carlsson et al. (2012) 105 108 5.82 5.39 0.26 -0.17 full
Casari (2009) 40 38 5.35 5.82 0.30 0.34 full
Chakravarty et al. (2011) 32 5 6.31 6.60 0.72 0.17 full
Chen et al. (2013) 26 46 6.15 6.28 0.35 0.10 full
Cobo-Reyes and Jimenez (2012) 32 44 4.50 5.23 0.29 0.34 full
Dave et al. (2010) 353 449 6.13 6.60 0.00 0.25 full
Deck et al. (2012) 27 20 6.30 5.75 0.31 -0.31 full
Dickinson (2009) 72 54 4.82 4.46 0.18 -0.23 partial
Drichoutis and Koundouri (2012) 20 37 4.45 5.32 0.28 0.31 full
Duersch et al. (2012) 104 96 4.38 5.28 0.00 0.58 partial
Eckel and Wilson (2004) 133 99 5.30 5.50 0.30 - summary
Eckel and Wilson (2006) 118 80 5.25 5.49 0.28 0.14 partial
Ehmke et al. (2010) 170 175 5.26 5.58 no - summary
Fiedler and Glöckner (2012) 11 18 6.55 7.78 0.12 0.72 full
Fiore et al. (2009) 21 19 6.24 6.00 0.23 -0.16 full
Glöckner and Hilbig (2012) 93 66 5.45 5.70 0.45 0.14 partial
Glöckner and Pachur (2012) 15 23 6.87 6.74 0.59 -0.08 full
Grijalva et al. (2011) 43 34 4.42 5.09 0.24 0.35 partial
Harrison et al. (2005) 72 80 5.43 5.89 0.07 0.32 full
Harrison et al. (2007) 14 7 3.50 1.79 0.22 -0.61 full
Harrison et al. (2013) 68 22 6.13 6.09 0.95 -0.02 full
Holt and Laury (2002) 114 85 5.95 6.33 0.13 0.23 full
Houser et al. (2010) 123 71 6 6.21 no - summary
Jacquemet et al. (2008) 47 40 5.79 6.25 0.29 0.28 partial
Jamison et al. (2008) 55 75 5.55 6.20 0.01 0.44 full
Lange et al. (2007a) 68 53 5.34 5.83 0.09 0.30 partial
Lange et al. (2007b) 97 75 5.27 5.55 0.19 0.19 partial
Levy-Garboua et al. (2012) 29 25 6.07 5.68 0.36 -0.24 full
Lusk and Coble (2005) 38 9 5.58 4.78 0.43 -0.44 full
Masclet et al. (2009) 39 40 5.10 5.38 0.75 0.14 full
Mueller and Schwieren (2012) 55 61 5.29 5.43 0.93 0.09 full
Nieken and Schmitz (2012) 131 156 5.27 5.46 0.53 0.11 full
Pogrebna et al. (2011) 27 30 5.22 5.57 0.68 0.21 partial
Ponti and Carbone (2009) 21 12 5.33 5.75 0.82 0.16 full
Rosaz (2012) 47 65 5.70 5.71 0.87 0.00 partial
Rosaz and Villeval (2012) 138 141 5.16 5.40 0.32 0.14 partial
Ryvkin (2011) 21 21 5.86 5.76 1.00 -0.05 full
Schram and Sonnemans (2011) 90 47 5.83 5.51 0.30 -0.22 full
Schunk (2009) 14 25 7.00 6.00 0.22 - summary
Shafran (2010) 31 33 4.55 5.15 0.16 0.40 full
Slonim and Guillen (2010) 74 42 5.09 5.74 0.07 0.38 full
Sloof and van Praag (2010) 39 47 5.08 5.45 0.19 0.28 full
Szrek et al. (2012) 80 118 5.15 5.86 0.03 0.34 full
Viscusi et al. (2011) 71 49 5.79 5.82 no - summary
Wakolbinger and Haigner (2009) 71 60 5.27 5.73 0.05 0.27 full
Yechiam and Hochman (2013) 5 6 5.00 5.00 0.93 0.00 full
Working papers
Crosetto and Filippin (2013b) 30 38 6.13 6.05 0.70 -0.05 full
Deck et al. (2010) 18 21 6.75 6.88 0.74 - summary
Delnoij (2013) 52 65 5.67 6.60 0.00 0.62 full
He et al. (2011) 100 100 4.48 5.25 0.05 - summary
Kocher et al. (2011) 97 49 5.40 5.84 0.03 0.28 full
Kocher et al. (2013) 157 126 5.62 5.95 0.07 0.21 partial
Laury (2005) 17 9 5.88 5.77 0.87 - summary
Niemeyer et al. (2013) 13 5 5.31 6.00 0.84 0.33 full
Schipper (2012) 110 78 4.68 4.67 0.78 -0.01 full
Table 6: Results by gender of the HL replications – consistent subjects only
Figure 1: Gender gap in risk taking across HL replications
we cannot rely upon the papers about which we only have descriptive statistics. We limit
our analysis to published papers.
The absolute frequency of inconsistent choices has already been summarised in Table 4.
In Table 7 we provide a more detailed picture showing a breakdown by gender and type of
inconsistency. Table 7 displays the number of inconsistent choices, overall and by gender,
out of the total number that can be potentially observed for each type of inconsistency. For
instance, multiple switching cannot be observed in papers in which a single switching deci-
sion is imposed by design. Always choosing the safer (riskier) lottery is a dominated action
only if there is a choice in which the good outcome has probability one (zero).10
Inconsistent choices % of inconsistent subjects
Number out of Males Females Total
Switching from B to A 973 6962 12.1 15.8 14.0
Always Option A 100 6334 1.8 1.3 1.6
Always Option B 6 383 1.4 1.7 1.5
Total 1079 -
Note. For each type if inconsistency the maximum number of observations (out of) has been
computed separately, including only the studies in which each event can possibly happen.
Table 7: Summary statistics of inconsistent subjects by type and gender
Multiple switching is the most common type of inconsistent behaviour, observed about
14% of the times. Females are significantly more likely to be inconsistent (Fisher Exact test
p < 0.001) and this at first glance seems to aim at numeracy as a possible explanation. These
differences survive also in a multivariate framework in which other possible determinants
are included. In particular, presenting the lotteries in random order dramatically increases
the fraction of inconsistencies. The number of choices in the price list also significantly
increases inconsistencies, although to a much lower extent, while the presence of monetary
incentives significantly reduces them.
Inconsistent subjects make on average 5.15 safe choices, without significant gender dif-
ferences (Mann Whitney test, p = 0.67). This number is lower than that of consistent sub-
jects (5.63), and significantly so (Mann Whitney test, p < 0.001). At first glance this seems to
suggest that inconsistent subjects tend to systematically bias downward the number of safe
choices. However, a more careful interpretation suggests that inconsistent subjects simply
tend to make choices that are closer to a random decision, which in the framework of the
HL task coincides with choosing each option half of the times. This interpretation is in line
with Andersson et al. (2013), who claim that the positive correlation between risk aversion
and IQ that has been emphasised, among others, by Dohmen et al. (2010), is an artefact of
the format of the price list.
Dominated choices are much less frequent. Gender in this case does not help explaining
the results, and neither do the other determinants, with the exception of monetary incen-
tives, that affect behaviour on the expected direction.
10We consider this to be the case when the probability of the good outcome is zero, but also for one paper
in which the lowest probability of the good outcome is 1%. Strictly speaking this is not a direct violation of
consistency but an expected utility maximiser should be characterised by an unbelievably high risk aversion
coefficient to choose the safe lottery in this case.
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4.2.2. Estimate of gender differences and determinants of the number of safe choices
In this Section we analyse the risk attitudes of consistent subjects only. Besides greatly
simplifying the estimated decision making process, this approach has the advantage of al-
lowing us to analyse the whole sample of microdata, as we must give up only the papers
with ’summary’ data.11 This is important because the higher variance in HL implementa-
tion details granted by the whole sample of published papers helps to better identify the
determinants of the choices.
Mean St.Dev N
Data (detail ! = ’summary’) 5.63 1.91 5935
Males 5.47 1.89 2998
Females 5.78 1.91 2937
Data (detail = ’full’) 5.73 1.96 4324
Males 5.59 1.94 2119
Females 5.87 1.97 2205
Table 8: Summary statistics of safe choices, published papers, consistent subjects only
Table 8 shows that on average males make a lower number of safe choices, while variance
is similar. Thanks to the high number of observations gender differences turn out to be
statistically significant (Mann Whitney test, p < 0.001) in both samples. The Cohen’s d on
the pooled sample is d = 0.163, a tiny 16% of a standard deviation, even below the threshold
of 0.2 used to identify a small effect. To give an example of how small this is, consider that
if we compared two random persons, and assuming normal distribution of risk preferences,
we would have a 54.3% chance of being correct when saying that the more risk averse of the
two is a woman, against a 50% rate if we just randomised our answer.
For the sake of comparison, we run a similar exercise using data for the Investment Game
and for the Eckel and Grossman task. For the IG we use the Cohen’s ds computed by Nelson
(2013) for all the studies included in the survey paper by Charness and Gneezy (2012). For
the EG task we use the data provided by the papers replicating the task, when available. In
both cases we add the Cohen’s d computed from our own data presented in Crosetto and
Filippin (2013b). The average effect size coincides for the two elicitation methods and it is
equal to d = 0.55, three and a half times the effect found in HL.12 This effect is still not huge,
but classifiable as a medium effect at the aggregate level.
A significant gender gap is found in the HL task only when considering a vast sample,
but it is negligible in size. In both IG and EG it is found even in small samples and it is three
and a half times as large.
The next step is to try to identify the determinants of the number of safe choices by
11Estimates including inconsistent subjects can be performed only for the subset of papers for which we have
’full’ data, as done via structural model estimation in Section 4.3.
12In order to make the two measures comparable, we compute the Cohen’s d for each paper in our dataset,
and we then compare the mean and distribution of this measure with the mean and distribution of the papers
for which we have enough data - 16 papers for the IG and 6 papers for the EG. The Cohen’s d for HL, computed
from our data, turns out to be dHL = 0.13, significantly different from dIG = 0.55 (Mann-Whitney, p-value <
0.001) and dEG = 0.55 (Mann-Whitney, p-value = 0.003).
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means of a regression analysis, whose results are reported in Table 9.
Dep. var.: number of safe choices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
female .311*** .315*** .280*** .288***
realmoney .013*** .020***
realmoney2/100 -.0.04*** -.0.07***
exchange/100 .010 -.002
randomorder .361*** .311***
fixed effects no no no yes
R2 .007 .019 .024 .095
N 5935 5935 4324 5935
Note. Fixed effects at the replication level
Table 9: Determinants of the number of safe choices
The unconditional gender difference is of 0.31 safe choices, and is significant (Column
1). In Column 2 we present our preferred specification.13 Gender differences barely change
when relevant factors are controlled for. On the other hand, we find that incentives matter.
Subjects tend to be more risk averse when the incentives increase, although less so at the
margin. We also find that the money illusion induced by inflating the experimental payoffs
(given the same amount of money at stake) has no effect. In contrast, administering the
lotteries in random order significantly increases the average number of safe choices on top of
increasing the likelihood of observing an inconsistent behaviour, as observed in the previous
section.
In Column 3 we estimate the same specification but restricting the sample to the pa-
pers for which we have ’full’ detail. We perform this exercise for the sake of comparability
with what will be shown in Section 4.3, where also inconsistent subjects are included in the
analysis, requiring the availability of all their binary choices. Results barely change, and in
particular the gender gap decreases only slightly at 0.28.
The panel dimension of our dataset allows to control for any observable and unobserv-
able characteristic common to each replication. Column 4 reports the results of a fixed effect
specification. Females make on average 0.288 safe choices more than males, confirming by
and large what found above.
The results of this section show that in HL task the choices of males and females are not
identical. However, this difference can be detected in a significant way only when the sta-
tistical power of the test is high, and it is economically unimportant in terms of magnitude.
This evidence is clearly different from what emerges for instance in the Investment Game or
in the EG task. Hence, evidence based on those two tasks only cannot be regarded as suf-
13There are different formats of the HL implemented, but variation is low. Many papers are exact replications
of HL. This generates problems of collinearity when including many controls at the same time. For instance, we
do not have enough variance to meaningfully estimate the effect of the support of probability spanned by the
HL list together with administering the lotteries in random order. Similarly, we cannot interact the features of
the HL task with gender. On the other hand, there is no gender difference in the reaction to the amount of money
at stake and in the random order of the lottery. Hence we do not include these interactions even if technically
possible.
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ficient to attribute the different observed behaviour to actual differences in the underlying
risk attitudes. The characteristics of the risk elicitation mechanism affect systematically the
measured risk preferences, and do not simply add some noise. Along the gender dimension
the influence of the features of the task is so important to affect the behaviour at the aggre-
gate level. The problem becomes then to disentangle the task vs. underlying preferences
conundrum. We start in the next section trying to exploit all the information we have con-
cerning the decision process, i.e., also including possible mistakes in a structural model that
includes a stochastic component.
4.3. Structural estimation with Maximum Likelihood
To assess the effect of gender on choices while controlling for both a level of noise in
decision making and the variations in the characteristics of the task we build a stochastic
choice model and estimate it through maximum likelihood. For this exercise we restrict our
focus to published papers for which we have the ’full’ microdata, and we can make use of
both consistent and inconsistent subjects. This leaves us with 5237 subjects.
We build our estimation using the error specification of Holt and Laury (2002), and us-
ing the script provided by Harrison (2008). We assume that subjects are expected utility
maximisers characterised by CRRA preferences U(x) = xr, and that they can make an eval-
uation error µ when comparing the utility of the two lotteries. The probability of choosing
the safe lottery (Option A) is
Prob(A) =
EU
1
µ
A
EU
1
µ
B + EU
1
µ
A
, and EUi =∑
j
pj(xj)r,
in which A is the safe lottery, B the risky lottery, and µ is the noise parameter. It is easily
shown that Prob(A) converges to 12 as µ → ∞, whilst, as µ → 0, it goes to 1 when EUA >
EUB and to 0 when EUA < EUB.
Given the above assumptions, we can write the log-Likelihood function as
LogLik =
{
ln Prob(A) if choice is safe
ln 1− Prob(A) if choice is risky ,
and then estimate separately for each paper and jointly over all the dataset a structural
model of choice using maximum likelihood and clustering standard errors by subject.14 We
allow for heterogeneity by gender of both r and µ, and we also include some controls when
estimating both parameters: a dummy for the random order of the choices (randomorder),
the money illusion induced via the experimental exchange rate (exchange), and the (possibly
quadratic) effect of the actual amounts of money at stake (realmoney). Results are shown in
Table 10 and are in line with what found in the previous section using regression analysis.15
The estimated risk parameter is r = 0.64, in line with the estimation in the original
HL paper for the 1× treatment, with females showing a significantly higher risk aversion.
14The estimate paper by paper gives similar results to the ones detailed in Table 6 and is not reported.
15Coefficients have opposite sign in Table 9 and Table 10, because the dependent variable in the former is
the number of safe choices, while in the latter the dependent variable is the risk aversion parameter. Given the
utility function employed, a higher r implies a lower risk aversion.
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CRRA specification u(x) = xr
Coeff. St.Err.
r constant 0.640 ∗∗∗ (0.0179)
female -0.0633 ∗∗ (0.0203)
realmoney/100 -0.457 ∗∗∗ (0.1028)
realmoney2/100 0.00158 ∗∗∗ (0.0003)
randomorder -0.0950 ∗ (0.0392)
exchange/1000 0.00348 (0.0313)
µ constant 0.229 ∗∗∗ (0.0073)
female -0.0135 (0.0085)
realmoney/100 -0.19 ∗∗∗ (0.0247)
realmoney2/100 0.000658 ∗∗∗ (0.0000)
randomorder 0.012 (0.0160)
exchange/1000 0.00861 (0.1160)
N decisions 52735
n subjects 5237
Log-likelihood -23494.025
Wald χ2 p-value 0.000
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. t statistics in parentheses.
Table 10: Maximum Likelihood CRRA estimation, u(x) = xr
Presenting the lotteries in a random order has a significant effect, increasing risk aversion.
Higher amounts at stake display a similar pattern, although decreasing at the margin. In
contrast, inflating numbers on screen by increasing the exchange rate between the experi-
mental currency unit and dollars (or euros) does not significantly affect the choices.
The average level of noise is µ ∼ 0.22, higher than what found in Dave et al. (2010).16
Females display a similar µ as males, providing some evidence against numeracy as a pos-
sible explanations of gender differences. In fact, if numeracy played a role in explaining the
results along a gender dimension, the lower understanding of the task should have been
reflected by a significantly stronger role played by confusion and captured by µ f emale. Inter-
estingly, and according to intuition, increasing the stakes slightly reduces noise in a concave
way. In contrast, the experimental currency inflation has no effect. Strikingly, displaying the
lottery choices in random order does not significantly increase the confusion coefficient.
5. Gender differences and the characteristics of the task
The analysis carried out above shows that the likelihood of observing gender differences
differs systematically across elicitation methods. The question then becomes why this is the
case and which characteristics of the tasks drive such a result.
16This is to be expected given the higher heterogeneity in terms of designs, list length, domains, and stakes in
our dataset.
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Higher noisiness of HL. It has been argued (Charness and Viceisza, 2011; Dave et al., 2010,
among others) that HL is a relatively demanding task from a cognitive point of view. Being
more difficult to understand than other methods, HL might elicit noisier signals. The noise
could then blur the evidence and lead to the observed lack of significant gender differences
in small to medium samples.
While relevant from a logical point of view (a noisier signal would both make differences
less likely to be significant and reduce the Cohen’s d) this argument fails empirically. HL in-
deed generates a high number of inconsistent choices, but this is a double-edged sword. On
the one hand, the presence of large shares of inconsistent subjects is a sign of the cognitive
complexity of the task; on the other hand, inconsistencies allow the researcher to single out
and exclude the subjects who did not understand the task, yielding a cleaner dataset. In
fact, there are several pieces of evidence consistently showing that HL is not noisier than the
other methods analysed once the inconsistent subjects are excluded.
First, inconsistent choices are indeed the channel through which complexity affects the
results in HL. Replicating the maximum likelihood estimation of Table 10 with consistent
subjects only, we find a lower estimate of noise of µ = 0.159, with the other results quali-
tatively unchanged. Moreover, pooling the sample by gender but interacting the µ with a
dummy for inconsistent choices we estimate the constant at µ = 0.146 and the coefficient on
the dummy at 0.521, both significant at < 0.01%.
Second, we compare the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) of the tasks, defined as the mean of
a signal divided by its standard deviation. If HL were noisier, it should display a lower SRN
than the other tasks. This is not the case. The SNR in our dataset of HL replications is equal
to 3.34, higher than the average of the replications of the SNR of the Investment Game (2.06)
and the EG task (2.41).17 These results are confirmed by a replication in a homogeneous
subject pool Crosetto and Filippin (2013b), with SNR of 3.27 for HL, 2.67 for IG and 2.16 for
EG.
Third, in Crosetto and Filippin (2013b) we simulate with virtual agents (not affected by
complexity and with a known distribution of risk preferences) the effect of the mechanics
of the different tasks on the measured risk attitudes. If HL induces noisier choices, we
should observe a sizeable discrepancy of the variance of choices in the human relative to the
virtual subjects. This is not the case. The standard deviation of measured preferences in the
simulations is similar to that obtained by consistent human subjects.
Theoretical comparison. Having excluded that the pattern of gender differences stems from
a different precision in measuring risk attitudes, we move to a quick comparison of the
methods described in Section 2 from a theoretical point of view. The goal is to identify the
features that correlate systematically with the observation of gender differences.
Apart from the number of choices, the tasks differ along three main lines: a) the lotteries
being generated by changes in probabilities rather than outcomes; b) the truncation of the
domain of risk preferences covered by the task; c) the availability of a safe (risk-free) option
among the set of alternatives.
17We use data from Nelson (2013) for the IG, and our computations for EG. Note that since we do not have
the microdata of the replications of IG and EG, we cannot compute the SNR of the pooled samples. However,
the distribution of the SNR of the individual replications of both IG and EG is significantly different than that
of the HL replications (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.001).
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The Investment Game and the EG task are similar as far as these theoretical charac-
teristics are concerned. They both generate lotteries varying the amounts at stake, while
probabilities are kept fixed at 50%. Moreover, both tasks can identify only different degrees
of risk aversion and cannot disentangle risk-loving from risk-neutral behaviour. In the IG
risk-neutral as well as risk-loving subjects should invest their entire endowment. In the EG
task lottery 5 yields the highest expected value and should be the preferred alternative of
risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects alike. Finally, both elicitation methods include risk-free
alternatives. EG includes a degenerate lottery with no uncertainty that is equivalent to a
safe choice, while in IG subjects have the opportunity of securing any amount between zero
and the whole endowment.
The HL task differs from IG and EG along all three dimensions. First, lotteries are gen-
erated changing probabilities over fixed outcomes. Second, HL measures preferences both
in the risk averse and in the risk loving domain. Third, the choice set does not include
a riskless alternative. The subject must incur some risks as the degenerate lottery in row
number ten of the original HL is played with 10% probability only. It can be argued that the
role of the risk-free alternative might be played by the low amount of the safe lottery, that
can be secured by always choosing Option A (except in row 10). Whether such an amount
can be considered as a risk-free alternative is disputable, but it is definitely less focal than
in the other two elicitation methods. In fact, it is not directly shown to the subjects, it re-
quires some elaboration to be identified, and its salience is likely diluted by the existence of
multiple choices, which induce row-by-row comparisons.18
The joint presence of these three factors (safe option, truncation of the domain, change
in probabilities vs change in amounts at stake with fixed 50% probability) seem to correlate
with the likelihood of observing gender differences in risk preferences. Evidence from the
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013a), a task sharing the three character-
istics with HL, goes in the same direction, since no gender differences are found.
The next step is to try to disentangle the role of each of these factors.
Our data allows us to exclude that the observed pattern of gender differences depend
on the truncation of the opportunity set. This could be true only if females were more
risk seeking in the risk loving domain. A task that covers only the risk aversion domain
could hide gender differences in the risk-loving domain, thereby delivering a upward biased
estimate of females’ risk aversion. Our dataset allows us to directly test and exclude this
possibility. In fact, in HL females appear slightly more risk averse uniformly, i.e., also in the
risk loving domain. Further evidence supporting this claim is provided by a different task,
namely the Outcome Scale method, consisting of a multiple price list with an increasing safe
option against the same 50/50 lottery. The Outcome Scale method has hence two features in
common with EG and IG, while, similarly to HL, it covers the entire domain of preferences.
A gender gap is a recurrent finding also with the Outcome Scale method. For instance,
gender differences are found by Dohmen et al. (2011); Sapienza et al. (2009); Sutter et al.
(2013), with Cohen’s d in the range of ∼ 0.35, while no differences are reported by Dohmen
et al. (2010); Masatlioglu et al. (2012).
18We tried to estimate an endogenous reference point à la Koszegi and Rabin (2007). This turned out not to be
possible due to identification problems, since several combinations of the reference point and the loss and risk
aversion parameter could generate the same data.
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The availability of a safe option within the set of alternatives has been shown to increase
the likelihood of observing violations of expected utility theory (Andreoni and Sprenger,
2012; Camerer, 1992; Harless and Camerer, 1994; Starmer, 2000), and therefore a possibility
is that the impact of certainty effects differs by gender.
The literature offers the possibility of testing this explanation only indirectly. Some HL
replications use a slightly modified version of the HL task in which subjects choose repeat-
edly between a safe amount and risky lotteries characterised by fixed amounts and differing
probabilities. We collected data from 15 studies using versions of HL that broadly fit into
this category. Within these studies, gender differences emerge more frequently when a safe
option is available (in 20% rather than 9.5% of the papers); when pooling the data and in-
teracting gender and the availability of a safe option in a joint regression, though, results do
not support a significant role of the safe option.
Unfortunately, such an exercise cannot be considered a meaningful and direct tests of
the safe option conjecture. The majority of the safe-option papers differ from the standard
HL in several dimensions. The number of options is higher (15) and limited to the range of
probability [0.3− 1] of the good outcome to occur. Moreover, the fixed amount is usually
lower than the expected value of the 50%− 50% risky lottery, it is kept constant across all
rows and is therefore different from the expected value of the corresponding Option A in
the classic HL. Finally, since the 15 papers we collected come from the same group of au-
thors employing the same design (it is the case of, among others, Cason et al., 2010; Price
and Sheremeta, 2011; Sheremeta, 2010), the variance in the sample comes mainly from dif-
ferences across rather than within the two subsamples, hence being confounded with the
availability of a safe option itself.
The role of fixed probability is even harder to ascertain given the existing literature. A
study by Bruner (2009) tests two different HL tables, one with changing stakes and one with
changing probabilities, but unfortunately no information on gender is available. Another
recent paper (Andersson et al., 2013) employs an Outcome Scale method without a safe
option, effectively replicating a HL method with fixed probabilities, but finds significant
gender differences in one of the two experiments of the study, and not in the other. On the
other hand, other tasks combine varying probability and varying outcomes with the absence
of a safe option, as is the case of the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET, Crosetto and Filippin,
2013a), in which no gender difference appears.
To directly test the role of a safe option and of 50-50 probabilities in triggering gender dif-
ferences, in a companion paper (Crosetto and Filippin, 2014) we ran clean HL, EG and BRET
replications with and without a safe option, and EG with and without 50-50 probabilities.
We find suggestive but not conclusive evidence. The availability of a riskless alternative al-
lows to rationalise gender differences in the HL and the BRET, but not in EG, where women
are more subject to a certainty effect but a gender gap persists in the no-safe version; the
50%− 50% fixed probabilities do not appear to play a significant role.
6. Discussion and conclusions
In the economics literature there is a wide agreement that females are more risk averse
than males. In this paper we reconsider this issue, complementing the existing literatures
with several findings.
24
First, we show that the emergence of gender differences appears to be task-specific.
While gender differences are a constant finding of both the Investment Game (Gneezy and
Potters, 1997) and of the Eckel and Grossman (2002) task, they do not appear in the Bomb
Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013a). A thorough survey of the literature
shows that gender differences are the exception rather than the rule also in the most widely
used risk elicitation task, Holt and Laury (2002).
Second, we provide the largest analysis of HL replications to date. Since HL is usu-
ally employed as a companion task in experiments focusing on other topics, the number
of papers directly reporting gender results is small relative to the number of replications.
By gathering the original data from the authors we built a dataset of 54 published papers
involving more than seven thousand subjects and covering more than half of all the HL pub-
lished replications. Analysing the dataset we find that gender differences appear only in less
than ten percent of the published papers. This striking difference is not due to a different
average sample size, and we can also exclude that it is an artefact of a greater complexity of
the HL task.
The creation of a comparable dataset of HL replications allows us to merge the data and
reach several further goals.
First, we can provide a reliable estimate of the typical results obtained with the HL task.
The average unconditional choice corresponds to an Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion
equal to ρ = 0.36. Incentives increase risk aversion in a significant and concave way. Incon-
sistent choices are commonly found, and characterise on average 14% of the subjects. We
find that females are more likely to display an inconsistent behaviour than males, but the
choices of inconsistent subjects do not differ by gender. Second, we shed light on the pattern
of inconsistent choices estimating a stochastic choice model with maximum likelihood. This
procedure provides some evidence against numeracy as a possible explanation of the gen-
der pattern. Third and foremost, merging the replications allows us to boost the statistical
power when testing the existence of gender differences, virtually eliminating the possibility
of facing a false negative. Doing so, significant differences are indeed detected. Their mag-
nitude is however economically unimportant, about a sixth of a standard deviation, three
times lower than what found for instance in the Gneezy and Potters (1997) Investment Game
or in the Eckel and Grossman (2002) lottery choice task.
Heterogeneity in risk preferences across tasks and domains has already been observed in
the literature. Our striking finding is that systematic differences exist at the aggregate level
even across incentivised tasks that consist essentially of one ingredient only: choices among
lotteries. The main difference between our results and the stated view in the literature is
that we link the likelihood of observing gender differences with the features of the task used
to elicit risk preferences. This is an interesting result per se because it proves that there is a
structure behind the finding of gender differences in risk attitudes. At the same time, if the
measured risk preferences depend on the elicitation tasks, it is natural to ask why this is the
case and which task gets closer to the true value of risk preferences.
We do not provide a final answer to this question, but we draw a map of the features
of the different tasks that might trigger different behaviour by gender. We can rule out
that the observed gender pattern is due to the different domain of preferences (risk-averse,
risk-loving) investigated by the risk elicitation methods. The characteristics that correlate
with the emergence of gender differences are restricted to a) the availability of a safe option
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among the set of alternatives, and b) the use of 50− 50 lotteries that vary only in the amounts
at stake. The first determinant is likely to trigger certainty effects, and it is known in the lit-
erature that safe options increase the likelihood of observing violation of the predictions of
Expected Utility Theory. The second factor prevents misperceptions of probabilities from
playing a role. Unfortunately, the studies available in the literature and an ad hoc experi-
mental investigation carried out in a companion paper, though hinting to a prominent role
of risk-free options and certainty effects, do not yield conclusive results. Further research
is needed to properly explain when and in which sense males are more risk tolerant than
females and what is the theoretical framework more suitable to represent this fact.
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